Premises:
- God is all-knowing
- This entails exhaustive knowledge of future events
- This entails exhaustive knowledge of contingency--the effects of any cause that may occur, actual or hypothetical.
- God is all-powerful
- That is, He can do absolutely anything He wishes to do.
- God is the Creator of all that is
- God is intentional in His actions
- That is, He does nothing without considering the effects of His actions, He is wise.
- God foresaw absolutely the effects of His creation.
- That is to say, in and prior to His creative act, He foresaw everything that would occur throughout all of time within His creation. From premise 1 and 3.
- God was capable of creating a world which differed from the actual world in any possible respect He desired. For instance, He could have created a world that was exactly like the actual world except that the Douglas Fir was yellow, or He could have created a world that was under the dominion of giant intelligent slugs. Each was equally possible. From premise 2.
4. The world God created, including all constituent parts, including the causes leading to each individual's salvation or non-salvation, was the one He intended. From premises 1, 3, and 4.
Thus follows predestination.
I have a difficult time finding flaws in that argument, though they may be there.
One attack on the argument is simply to deny the premises. They either flatly deny the attributes of God (which I do not intend to defend at this time, as this argument is meant for evangelical Christians), or limit them. They might say that God has no foreknowledge (a clearly unbiblical position), or that it doesn't extend to minor events or the results of "free-will". I think this is an untenable position as well, since it's dubious, if not frankly impossible, for one to have certain foreknowledge of the "great events" of history without knowing all of the individual causes that led to that event. Furthermore, the biblical witness records many times where God did foreknow the results of a free-will decision (see http://books.google.com/books?id=XdwY4id2kMUC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_slider_thumb#v=onepage&q&f=false if you want mounds of biblical evidence). Furthermore there are a number of more general references that state that God knows the ways of man better than man himself (for instance Prov 20:24).
It is obvious that a knowledge which includes the foreknown results of free will decisions is more perfect than one that doesn't, and I believe that one should have some very solid evidence before they diminish the perfection of God.
Attempts to limit God's power seem even less tenable. Some have argued that God's control over human free is impossible because His character demands it (claiming that this case is similar to God's inability to lie not limiting his power). First, I'm not sure which part of His character demands that. You might argue (though I would disagree here too) that His love for our freedom or some such nonsense requires him to refrain from interfering, but here the premise is his capability to do all things, not His exercise of that capability.
Premise 3 is impossible to deny without positing some other god or a creation that exists independently of (and co-eternally with) God. Premise 4 is similarly difficult to deny withing a biblical worldview.
It seems to me, then, that the arguments flow directly from the premises. The main point is, that foreknowledge and omnipotence imply predestination. A similar argument was used by Leibniz to argue that the real world is the best possible world that could ever exist (if it wasn't, God would have created some other world), an argument some have assaulted along some of the same grounds I mentioned above, but I don't believe successfully without denying biblical theism. I'll think about it a little more, maybe I can find some more holes, how about you guys?
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An aside: Some deny arguments such as the above by resorting to irrationalism or pietism. I won't attempt to refute those positions at the moment, but I certainly believe that if an argument's premises are correct, and its logic is correct, the conclusion is true. This argument isn't a rigorous exegetical argument, proof texted extensively (though there are certainly such arguments for predestination), but if the premises are biblical and the logic is not faulty (and it may be here, that's what I'm trying to see), then the conclusion is true, whether it's about God or not.
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An aside: Some deny arguments such as the above by resorting to irrationalism or pietism. I won't attempt to refute those positions at the moment, but I certainly believe that if an argument's premises are correct, and its logic is correct, the conclusion is true. This argument isn't a rigorous exegetical argument, proof texted extensively (though there are certainly such arguments for predestination), but if the premises are biblical and the logic is not faulty (and it may be here, that's what I'm trying to see), then the conclusion is true, whether it's about God or not.
These aren't proper syllogistic premises because there's an extra step between them and the premises you actually use. It'd probably help to set them up that way.
ReplyDeleteSay I accept the premises given: I'd still argue that given the certain rules of the universe we observe, there are limiting factors. Could God create flying slugs with laser vision? Sure - but not in our universe. I'd also argue that uncertainty is built into the universe, a direct contradiction to part of the first premise that you use in the second argument.
In truth, I don't accept the premises. I'd seriously argue the first premise on the basis of the second (He could have created a universe with true potential for free will inbuilt and creatures capable of free will), and I'd argue the second on the basis of the second, because God has shown divine self-limiting, including in His attributes, i.e. real goodness, which I'd say contradicts argument 3 by this (admittedly mildly loosely-formed) syllogism:
Nobody good tortures people for something beyond their control.
People born without hope for salvation have this beyond their control.
Therefore nobody good tortures people born without hope for salvation.
Anyway, if there's one thing studying theology has taught me, it's that "Perfect Being Theology" is trouble. usually beginning with thoughts like, "Since God is perfection, then..." It's not irrationalism, it's just admitting that God doesn't actually fit into anybody's 'perfect-being' concepts, really a shocking thing to everyone in every culture.
-Ben
Thanks for the comments Ben. Yeah the argument wasn't exactly formulated in a rigorously syllogistic manner, partially because I wrote it after midnight and partially because I know that a lot of the people that might read it don't know the first thing about syllogisms.
ReplyDeleteAs for your arguments, obviously, you can defeat the argument by flatly denying the premises.
I'm not so ready to admit that there are limiting factors to God's action based upon the rules of the universe. You can argue, and I'd agree with you, that God is bound by the rules of logic as a function of his character (his intelligibility demands it). However to argue that He is bound, in this universe or in his prior creative act of the universe, by any physical law, is to say that those laws are prior to God. That is to say, their existence is more fundamental than God Himself. To me that's a shocking assertion, and certainly an unorthodox view. I don't see any reason why He couldn't create flying slugs with laser vision, in this world or any other. The laws of this world are subject to His creative ability as much as anything else.
If uncertainty is built into the system, divine foreknowledge is limited (and probably nonexistent, since like I mentioned above, it's dubious whether you can divorce certain knowledge of the broad strokes of history from their constituent parts). I think it's rather clear from the Biblical witness (see my link in my main post) that God's foreknowledge is rather extensive and any limitations of it must bear a fairly substantial burden of proof.
The second premise, if understood in an orthodox manner, I think is no challenge to the first. God is limited, in practice if not in ability, by His own character. He cannot lie, for instance. To say that He can create a future that He doesn't know is similar to arguing that he can create a rock that He cannot move. To do so would be to destroy His essential attributes, rendering Him less than God. He obviously cannot become not God anymore than we can become not human.
In regards to your syllogism, I would deny the second part. Determinism (or at least Calvinistic determinism) does not imply lack of control, it only implies certainty. Those determined for damnation have salvation within their control. God will not turn away any who seek him. The issue is that their free will rejection of the hope offered is determined, not of compulsion, but through the natural interaction of environment, biology, and other such factors. People make choices for reasons (conscious or no) and are therefore determined. To say otherwise would be to render the will unintelligible and only make choices entirely random, surely no basis for moral accountability. I would question the first statement as well in that I believe in conflates God's justice with man's justice. Man judges man's actions, God judges the heart. If the heart is deceitful and wicked essentially, then it merits judgment, regardless of whether it acted upon that wickedness or no.
You're right in that perfect-being theology can be troublesome. It certainly isn't an airtight argument, but it can be suggestive. Your own syllogism is actually similar, as it depends on a "good-being" understanding that may or may not be true. We do, however know that God is perfect (whatever that may entail), and I would argue that our naturally endowed (though darkened) sense of goodness and perfection are certainly instructive, though not "perfect", guides to God's character.